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For obvious reasons, the literature on post-communist privatization was, at the beginning of transformation, essentially normative. On the basis of first principles and some, rather meagre, experience from privatization in Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and developing countries, a flood of papers tried to categorize the available options and discussed the pros and cons of different ways to privatize state-owned enterprises. In the course of transition, however, this picture has changed and an increasing number of studies has begun to develop a modified and in many respects more elaborate perspective on privatization.
To understand this shift of perspective, it needs to be emphasized first that privatization cannot be seen as a genuine economic objective. Rather, if the ultimate objective of the economic transformation is the improvement of economic welfare through increased competition and an efficient division of labour, the implementation of competitive markets is what matters most, and the role of privatization must be seen in the light of its relationship to this goal. That is, the relevant question is now whether markets emerge more or less spontaneously and automatically and whether the transfer of property rights to private hands is a necessary if not sufficient condition for the efficient working of the economic system. Moreover, to what extent does privatization contribute to the emergence of economic actors, and to the development of constraints and incentives which are conducive to market-related behaviour?
Two observations indicate that these questions are far from trivial. For one thing, the transformational recession which has hit all transformation countries much more severely than originally expected attests to the fact that the abolishment of one coordination mechanism, the plan, does not result in the automatic emergence of another, the market. Rather, abolishing the plan means first of all that there is no coordination mechanism whatsoever. At least in part, the transformational recession has therefore to be explained by a lack of coordination (Kornai, 1994) . For another, not least the Chinese experience suggests (cf. Weitzman, 1993; Herrmann-Pillath, 1994; Krug, 1997) that privatization is not evidently necessary for the implementation of a market economy and hence the emergence of markets as the central element of such an economic order. Apparently, decentralized coordination via the price mechanism as well as competition among economic agents can emerge even if the structure and allocation of property rights is neither well specified nor individualized.
Indeed, that the transfer of public property to private hands does not suffice for the implementation of a functioning market economy is underlined by the continuing debate in both established market economies and transition economies on the relative merits of different systems of corporate governance as exemplified by the commonplace contrast between the Anglo-Saxon capital market-based system, on the one hand, and the Germanic bank-based system on the other (cf. Edwards and Fischer, 1994; Wagener, 1996 Wagener, , 1997 and by the concerns this debate has raised regarding the fear of short-termism and excessive insider power, respectively.
A second reason which explains the aforementioned shift of perspective is that, 10 years into privatization, there can be no doubt that privatization is a political project, as is the implementation of a market economy in general. Indeed markets and their accompanying institutions are, and have always been, the (by-)products of political processes
